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The essays above let us see what kinds of knowledge are incited by the later works of Michel 
Foucault? These essays, in turn, invite us to find how those knowledges may be been implicit in 
earlier colonial and postcolonial self-reflection. Let me begin with subjectivation. Various 
branches of the Social Sciences have at times posited a universal subject, the agent whose 
preferences interact with circumstances to produce behavior. The most notorious of these 
universal subjects is perhaps the construct known as Rational Economic Man (Hollis and Nell 
1975). A similar strategy is evident in the ideologies justifying colonialism, or legitimating the 
bourgeois social order. Here, we are presented with a teleology, the civilizing process through 
which the savage evolves into the civilized subject. The savage shows itself in the form of the 
indigenous peoples of external lands to be conquered (Césaire 2000) or in the form of the 
dangerous classes (Chevalier 1973) internal to the core. Already in Les mots et les choses (1966), 
Foucault (1971, 386) took this universal subject as his target concluding that: ‘One thing in any 
case is certain: man is neither the oldest nor the most constant problem that has been posed for 
human knowledge.’ This universal subject, then, is a historical creation. By historicizing this 
notion, Foucault added to the scholarship that challenges the Eurocentrism of the 
Enlightenment project.  
Of course, this challenge had multiple sources. In a chapter above, Prathama Banerjee 
describes as developmentality the set of interests that I have outlined as the civilising mission. 
Banerjee says that, as a form of governmentality, developmentality claims a knowledge of the 
lack among the people who need developing. Being interpellated as inadequate can, particularly 
when reinforced by spectacular violence, produce an identification with the Master that elicits 
mimicry (Bhabha 1984). Yet, inadequacy and shame is an uncomfortable position and, as Srila 
Roy shows in her chapter above with her description of the feminist Action Hero blog, they 
directly excite resistance.  
In the eighteenth-century Jonathan Swift felt he had been consigned to the periphery 
when the best position offered him was as Dean of St Patrick’s cathedral in Dublin. Although 
born in Ireland, he would have preferred a position in one of the great English cathedrals. With 
time, he came to identify with the plight of his Irish neighbours and saw very many of their 
problems as due, not to their backward character, but to British misrule. He felt this misrule as a 
personal insult and he expressed his anger not only through the famous essay, ‘A modest 
proposal’ (Swift 1984), that satirised British rule as leaving the Irish nothing to eat but their own 
children, but also in a set of essays about the Irish economy showing that the universal ‘truths’ of 
economics simply did not apply in a colonial economy. In one essay, he referred to these 
universals as ‘Maxims Controlled in Ireland’ (Swift 1971), that is truths controverted by Irish 
circumstances.  
In this case, the colonized subject recognises that the supposedly universal principles of 
economic relations do not apply in the same way to the colony. They are in fact both a 
projection and an ambition. In Economics, methodological individualism (Hodgson 2007) serves 
a clearly ideological purpose. Mitt Romney, running for US President, when challenged to raise 
money for social welfare by taxing corporations, responded with precisely this sort of 
methodological individualism: ‘Corporations are people, my friend’ (Rucker 2011). Basking in the 
glory of her third-time election as British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher also rejected higher 
social spending in exactly these terms: ‘There is no such thing [as society]! There are individual 
men and women and there are families and no government can do anything except through 
people and people look to themselves first’ (Thatcher 1987). If production is a collective 
enterprise, then, the holders of wealth owe obligations of fairness to the collective of which they 
are a part. If, on the other hand, wealth is made by individuals, then, it should, it might seem, be 
appropriated by those same individuals.  
This individuation is, in ideological terms, what Ritu Birla in a chapter above, refers to as 
disembedding the economy. To produce an economy of individual subjects, the law sawed 
through the ties between ownership and social formations. Birla names the production of a 
‘liberal governmentality,’ ‘the improving mission of British Utilitarians.’ If Indian economic 
subjects were made over into liberal economic subjects, then, the British could, they believed, 
trust that market imperatives would serve their interests by inducing Indians to export to Britain 
raw materials and import British manufactures. The civilizing process required that the initial 
conditions for a liberal economy be established, if necessary by force (Nally 2011). In this 
respect, at least, Vivek Chibber (2013, 100) is right: ‘Capitalism universalizes market 
dependence.’ As Michael Watts (1983) and Mike Davis (2000) show, individualizing property 
titles and imposing money taxes, undermined the resilience of indigenous societies, converting 
peasants into proletarians at each famine, and as James Scott (2009) documents, indigenous 
peoples have very often understood monetary taxes as nothing less than just this attack on their 
independence. Birla (above) gives a stupendous example of this disembedding. It was the 
practice of wealthy Hindu families to give funds to local charities but with the proviso that 
should the family firm meet temporary setback the funds could be reclaimed until once again 
they could be repaid. Rather than accept that gifts might be conditional, might reinforce and 
sustain a set of social interrelations, the British passed a law that recognised as a legal entity, the 
deity of the local charity and treated the charitable gift as a permanent alienation of funds to the 
deity. Better God than Society. 
To the colonizer, the colony is, as Banerjee says, a place of lack, a place that is, as 
Johannes Fabian (1983) remarks, from an earlier time. The colonized begins by seeing itself 
through the eyes of the dominating colonial power. In this sense, James Joyce has Stephen in 
Ulysses offer a number of images for the work of the Irish artist, one of which plays on the 
criticism of realism offered by another Irishman, Oscar Wilde. In the Preface to The Picture of 
Dorian Gray, Wilde, referring back to the character that represents the indigenous savage in 
Shakespeare’s The Tempest, suggested that:  
The nineteenth century dislike of Realism is the rage of Caliban seeing his 
own face in a glass. 
 The nineteenth century dislike of Romanticism is the rage of Caliban 
not seeing his own face in a glass (Wilde 1994, 5). 
Wilde preferred Romanticism. In one essay, ‘The Decay of Lying,’ Wilde had Cyril concede to 
the Wilde alter ego, Vivian: 
I can quite understand your objection to art being treated as a mirror.  You 
think it would reduce genius to the position of a cracked looking-glass (Wilde 
1913, 30). 
This is the image that Joyce picks up and refracts. In the first chapter of Ulysses, Buck Mulligan, 
while shaving, holds out to Stephen a cracked mirror, one that Mulligan had earlier lifted from 
the room of his mother’s domestic servant. Stephen asks himself if the fractured image is actually 
how others see him, and at that point Mulligan invokes Wilde: 
Laughing again, he brought the mirror away from Stephen’s peering eyes. 
–– The rage of Caliban at not seeing his face in a mirror, he said. If Wilde 
were only alive to see you! 
 Drawing back and pointing, Stephen said with bitterness: 
–– It is a symbol of Irish art. The cracked lookingglass of the servant (Joyce 
1986, 1.141-6). 
This is a complex and dense rendering of the colonial subject but it is clearly an account of 
subjectivation.  
Caliban, an anagram of cannibal, the contemporary Dutch term for the inhabitants of the 
Caribbean, has been a central figure in postcolonial readings of Shakespeare (Lamming 1960; 
Retamar 1989; Greenblatt 1990). There are two accounts of Caliban in The Tempest. The first is 
similar to Deana Heath’s account above of the colonial construction of the colonized as being 
inherently violent. This version is given by Prospero and by his daughter Miranda. Prospero says 
that he when he came to the island, he found Caliban a filthy beast who could be directed only 
by whipping, and that he took him into his own home as a servant, until Caliban attempted rape 
upon Miranda whereupon Prospero used his magic to confine him to a cave. Miranda, likewise, 
claims to have treated Caliban kindly, teaching to him her language, but that it later became 
obvious to her that Caliban was of such ‘vile race’ that ‘good natures | Could not abide to be 
with’ (Tempest, 1.2, 359–61). The violence and prejudice of Prospero and Miranda are self-
evident, but Shakespeare also gave Prospero’s slaves, Caliban and Ariel, their own accounts of 
their capture and treatment. Caliban says Prospero dispossessed him of the island, which he had 
inherited from his mother. Caliban asserts that Prospero could not have survived on the island 
without Caliban’s assistance and that at first this help had been given willingly in return for 
kindly treatment: ‘When thou camest first, | Thou strokedst me and madest much of me| […] 
and then I loved thee’ (Tempest, 1.2, 333–4, 337). He implies that it was only natural that he 
should want to father children with the only woman on the island, Prospero’s daughter Miranda. 
He accepts that he learned from Miranda to speak in her language but that the chains of 
Prospero’s magic made his life such misery that having learned their language ‘my profit on ’t | 
Is I know how to curse’ (Tempest 1.2.364-5). If Caliban is bestial, it is clear that Prospero is much 
to blame: ‘Hag-seed, hence! | Fetch us in fuel, and be quick […] | If thou neglect’st, or dost 
unwillingly | What I command, I’ll rack thee with old cramps, | Fill all thy bones with aches, 
make thee roar, | That beasts shall tremble at thy din’ (Tempest 1.2.366-7, 369-72). 
Such treatment will produce a beast but also a subjectivity. In his chapter above on the 
subjectivation of animals, Jonathan Saha gives an account of the mastering of an elephant, Ngwe 
Maung, that in its horror recalls Caliban’s roar. Brutality towards both animals and humans were 
part of colonial rule and in both cases a subjectivation was the object of the regime of pain. In 
his chapter Stephen Legg writes of colonial truth regimes that not only demanded truth acts as 
loyalty tests but that also used psychological techniques of seclusion and isolation to break down 
political prisoners. The subject produced here is of the deranged body in pain (Scarry 1985). In 
her chapter, Deana Heath explores the contradiction between the colonial authority denying that 
violence should be part of liberal governance and yet presiding over a system where violence was 
a regular part of criminal investigation and even of tax collection. The colonial authorities 
concluded that the failure lay with the Indian people themselves who had been inured to 
violence by centuries of despotic rule and who understood very little else. Heath cites cases 
where the evidence of torture is dismissed as the self-harm characteristic of a depraved people. 
Once again, we see the lack that the colonizer sees in the colonized, and once again it produces a 
sense of superiority and innocence for the colonizer. 
Wilde was living in England and set The Picture of Dorian Gray in London. In this context, 
to use the figure of Caliban to represent the artist, was to reclaim the subordinate, subaltern, 
position as the place from which to speak Beauty to Power. From the Realist, rather than 
Romantic pole, Joyce does something similar. He has Stephen ask how others see him, and 
recognises that it is only in this fashion that he can see himself, refracted by their gaze. 
Colonialism has stripped Stephen of a continuity of identity with the cultural heritage of his 
homeland and even his language is not his own for he must speak in English to be understood, 
not only by others, but even by himself. But common words will have local inflection. In A 
Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man, Joyce presents Stephen as a university student and, in 
conversation with an English Jesuit priest, Stephen reflects on his resistance to English words 
and concepts: 
His language, so familiar and so foreign, will always be for me an acquired 
speech. I have not made or accepted its words. My voice holds them at bay. 
My soul frets in the shadow of his language (Joyce 1921, 221). 
Faced with the force of the coloniser’s view, the colonial subject may appear limited to mimicry 
or a sort of ironic exaggeration that might deflate colonial pomposity, as David Lloyd (1987) 
illustrates so wonderfully for the Irish poet, James Clarence Mangan. Yet Wilde’s (1913, 38) 
Romantic purpose uses the mirror to a quite different effect: ‘Life holds the mirror up to Art, 
and either reproduces some strange type imagined by painter or sculptor, or realises in fact what 
has been dreamed in fiction.’ Art, then, might instigate utopia, ‘refusing to affirm the miserable 
course of the world as the iron law of nature’ (Adorno 2013, 68). The postcolonial subject might, 
then, think otherwise about a world that presents itself as mere necessity. As Spivak (1999, 37) 
concludes, the postcolonial subject ‘cannot merely continue to act out the part of Caliban.’ 
In this respect, and as several chapters above suggest, ‘care of self’ (Foucault 1986) can 
elaborate a new subjectivity where a different external order is projected from novel control over 
the self. Legg, above, writes of Mohandas Gandhi elaborating a form of self-discipline that, in its 
adherence to non-violence, promised subjects a way to a truth undistorted by social antagonism. 
Legg also shows that this allowed the development of an alternative governance based on civil 
disobedience a radical separation from colonial structures. Subjectivation breeds power. In her 
chapter above, Srila Roy traces a similar set of strategies onwards to Indian feminism today, 
where cultivating the pleasures of just being in public space, can further the assertiveness and 
self-respect of Indian women in the face of a predominant rape culture that would drive them 
into privacy and invisibility. The anticolonial example of Gandhi might even now be deployed 
against a neoliberal governmentality shaped by the legacies of colonialism, and it is striking that 
the loitering campaign of Indian women, described by Roy, is not only about occupying public 
space, but does so in the cause of non-commodified sociability. 
This postcolonial character of South Asian governmentalities is far from settled in current 
scholarship. Chibber (2013) has argued that in the early scholarship of the Subaltern Studies 
group, the Indian middle class was convicted of failing in its historical mission to overcome the 
landed classes and thus it was unable to deliver at independence a proper bourgeois democracy, 
nor was it able to incorporate the subaltern classes in its national project. Chibber is astute on 
the ways a heroic (and inaccurate) version of bourgeois revolutions in England and France has 
been used normatively to establish Indian inadequacies.  Nevertheless, there is a question here 
that requires an answer. Is there a postcolonial reason for the distance between formal 
constitutional equality promising individual rights and a post-independence practice that 
compromises individualism with group-based concessions? In his chapter above, Partha 
Chatterjee talks of an electoral populism in India that gives political society the character of a 
series of exceptions, as, in return for electoral quiescence, different groups receive special 
attention from a state that in this moment exercises what Foucault has taught us to recognize as 
pastoral governance. In their Introduction above, Heath and Legg refer to this as para-legal 
welfare in contrast to citizenship welfare. Indrani Chatterjee’s chapter above proposes a pre-
colonial origin for this pastoral care. Early communities of Buddhist and Jaina monks served 
communities with irrigation and health-care. This tradition provided one basis for criticizing the 
colonial state for its failure to sustain life. From anticolonial politics, this obligation to care was 
transferred to the independent state. Pramartha Banerjee’s account of the antipolitics of the 
Party of the Common Man (Aam Admi) reports its emphasis upon people’s right to the basic 
preconditions for good living, and advancing an everyday democracy of common services. 
Partha Chatterjee’s argument about electoral populism suggests a further postcolonial 
possibility. In a brilliant analysis of post-Apartheid South Africa, Gillian Hart (2014) describes 
how the rights-based constitution of newly-independent South Africa met material and political 
obstacles. Having accepted that it would not nationalize the commanding heights of the 
economy, the new government found itself without the resources to fulfill in short order the 
egalitarian obligations for housing, electricity and education to which it had committed itself. 
Beyond this, the leaders of the armed struggle feared losing electoral majorities unless they 
mobilized the ethnic divisions that in constitutional terms they were committed to erasing. 
Having legitimated the new government in universalist terms, the African National Congress 
now finds itself migrating towards a Zulu identification as it tries to ensure continued 
governance. But, as the promise of egalitarian services is dashed, various townships mobilise 
violently against the new order (Gibson 2011). To meet these rebellions the state makes 
concessions of precisely the kind that Partha Chatterjee documents. Yet, in South Africa, the 
ethnic identities that are now mobilized and energized as political identities against universalism, 
had previously been inflected by the divide-and-rule practices of the colonial government 
(Mamdani 1996). Of course, the same techniques had been used in India and Banerjee’s chapter 
notes a particular postcolonial legacy in that the recognition that the British had cultivated 
difference in order to rule more easily led many to assume that such inequalities would disappear 
with independence and, as Banerjee shows, it took some time before the continuing 
discrimination against lower castes was made an explicit concern of government. Furthermore, 
Banerjee shows that, as with a Zulu identity in South Africa, a Hindu identity in India has been 
invoked as a majoritarian right to determine social rights in a sectarian manner. Banerjee’s 
account of B.R. Ambedkar leading a mass rally of Dalits in formal secession from the Hindu 
nation is both sad and telling. This disappointment is not really countered by the elevation of 
untouchables into uniformed collectors of plastic-bags, as described above in Sara Hodges’ 
excellent account of the historical specificity of the manifestations of plastic in Indian cities.  
Having been subjectivated in particular ways by a colonial power, colonial subjects have 
ever found ways to question the universal categories that seem to legitimate their own 
subordination and that offer as a civilising prospect only impossible assimilation to the master’s 
culture. Richard Kearney (1997) describes various ways that Irish philosophers felt 
uncomfortable with the universals of British empiricist philosophy and Protestant theology. 
Given the importance of Foucault’s period (1966-8) in Tunisia (Elden 2017), we should perhaps 
ask not only what profit postcolonial scholarship can derive from Foucault but we might follow 
the lead of Robert Young (2004) and ask to what extent the reflection and practice of colonial, 
and later postcolonial, subjects in very many contexts can itself ground many of the central 
concerns of post-humanist scholarship. In Les mots et les choses, Foucault anticipated the central 
figure of Man deleted from European thought when its historically-contingent conditions were 
undercut, ‘then one can certainly wager that man would be erased, like a face drawn in sand at 
the edge of the sea’ (Foucault 1971, 386). Perhaps the tide that advanced upon that face was the 
swelling assertion of the damned of the earth (Fanon 2004), rejecting their colonial 
subjectivation so that they might claim the right to try for a world more free of European 
colonialism and its attendant Eurocentric ideology of the universal subject. 
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